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Abstract 
This report presents data drawn from two studies of US-based private military 
contractors (PMCs), including what we believe is the largest independent survey yet 
conducted on the Private Military industry.  Results from the first study (a structured 
interview) include the identification of key variables industry managers use to 
differentiate between firms in the industry, and a simple cognitive model industry 
participants use to orient themselves in the industry landscape.  Key results from the 
second study include the identification of several important differences between 
large and small competitors in the industry and identification of the key variables 
industry managers use when evaluating the qualities of firms with whom they sub-
contract.  Overall, this study will help professionals who do business with PMCs 
better understand the nature of the industry.      
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I. Introduction 
In this report, we present our recent research on market niches in the 
business of private military contractors (PMCs ).  Past research has posited a 
number of different schemas for classifying participants in the industry (Singer, 2003; 
Avant, 2005).  In this report we ask: what would constitute a valid and accurate 
understanding of the industry?  Our write-up describes our efforts and conclusions 
regarding this question.  The research questions we focus on are: 
1. What are the distinct niches into which the overall sector is divided?  
Are perceptions of these niches widely shared? 
2. If so, what are the underlying dimensions on which niches vary?  What 
drives differentiation between players that do business in particular 
niches? 
3. What might we learn about the structure of competition in different 
niches and across the sector as a whole? 
4. What might we learn about patterns of cooperation between firms in 
the sector?  When do firms cooperate with each other, and why? 
 
We are hopeful that this work will have practical merit for the professional 
acquisition community in the DoD.  Numerous authorities have called recently for 
better-informed purchasing policies, particularly with regard to service contracting 
and, more specifically, the contracting of private security firms (Gansler, 2007; CRS, 
2009).  This study is designed to help acquisition professionals perform their job 
tasks better by enabling them to have an even more informed understanding of an 
important service sector that the DoD (and other US government agencies such as 
the DoS and the USAid) draws on extensively.  Clearly, if the current practice of 
contracting out a wide variety of support services continues, then the importance 
and relevance of having a better understanding of the nature of this industry will only 
deepen in the future. 
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The research we report here draws on our prior work on the sector (Dew & 
Hudgens, 2008) and on research techniques developed within strategic 
management (Porac, Thomas, Wilson, & Paton, 1995) that can help us gain a better 
understanding of the nature of the sector.  In examining the sector, we have drawn 
extensively on this body of techniques.  The report describes the data we gathered 
and lays out some rudimentary analysis of it.  We drew on: 
(a)   Structured interviews with 19 industry participants who collectively 
have over 389 years experience in private military or uniformed 
service.  These interviews generated over 400 transcribed pages of 
data. 
(b)  A comprehensive survey administered to 313 individuals working for 
firms in the sector that to date has elicited 61 responses.  This survey 
has generated a large body of statistical data. 
The report proceeds as follows.  Following this brief introduction, the second 
section explains our research methods: who we interviewed and surveyed, what our 
interview and survey techniques were, and how we analyzed the data.  In the third 
section, we lay out our initial analysis of the interview data we collected.  Section 
four presents some of the key data we gathered using our survey.  A brief 
conclusion follows. 
Readers should note that in writing this technical report, we have put our 
efforts into explaining our research methods and presenting the data we’ve 
collected.  The report is therefore “light” on theory, explanation, interpretation and 
discussion of implications.  We think the majority of readers will agree that most of 
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II. What We Did to Collect Data: Our Research 
Methodologies 
A. Getting Data on the Industry 
Because PMCs are a relatively new industry (half the firms are under 13 
years old, much of the sector grew up only in the 1990s, and some segments of the 
industry are even newer) acquisition professionals don’t have the informational 
benefits of a long history of transactions and market activities (unlike aircraft 
purchasing, for example).  Moreover, significant parts of the PM sector are rather 
secretive, either by policy or because they are small, private firms that are not 
required to release public information about themselves.  In general, it is a tight-
lipped industry, protective of information sources, anxious to keep out of the public 
eye, and shy of investigators (Fainaru, 2007).  
Recently, either because of investigative journalism or US government 
information gathering, more data is becoming available about the industry.  Bruneau 
(2009) points out that there has been an explosion of data available on the industry 
(compared to pre-2004, for example) owing to US congressional attempts to achieve 
better oversight of private military contractors working in Iraq, including DoD, USAid 
and DoS spending on PSCs (private security companies) in Iraq, the number of 
contractor personnel active, and other important information.  As useful as this is in 
building some basic statistics on the industry, it is not the kind of industry-level 
information that we have pursued in this study.  In fact, our view is that there is no 
shortage of information available on the topic of PMCs, but there is not enough of 
the right kinds of data that would tell us much about the way the sector behaves.  
Therefore, one of our main goals in this study has been simply to collect some data 
that is useful for the purposes of describing the industry—from people inside it.  
Essentially, this involves getting industry participants to tell us about their rivalries 
with other firms, and using this data to build a picture of the market niches and 
rivalries within the overall PM sector.   
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We expected data collection to be challenging, and it has lived up to our 
expectations.  In our 2008 project, we collected data based on public information 
sources (Dew & Hudgens, 2008).  The work we report on now involves data 
collection via structured interviewees and a survey.  As with most empirical data, the 
basic issue is that no one data source will usually suffice.  A better research strategy 
is to use multiple data sources, build in some redundancy, and expect that some 
data collection efforts will go better than others, i.e., to rely on the portfolio strategy 
for data collection. 
B.   Data We Collected in This Study—Why, How, Who 
The overall study involves two research methods: 
1. A first round of structured interviews with 19 industry insiders (the 
methodology we have used here enables us to differentiate the market 
segments within the sector); 
2. A second round of a survey instrument directed at a larger group of 
industry participants (to help identify the structure of competition and 
collaboration across market segments). 
Before we proceed, let us say a word about data confidentiality and how we 
present the data in this study.  University research that involves human subjects can 
only be undertaken with the approval of human-subjects oversight bodies at those 
institutions (in our case, at NPS and UC Irvine, where our collaborators on this study 
resided).  We have taken great care to ensure the anonymity of individual 
respondents and firms in the study.  Our goal is to better understand the industry at 
an aggregate level—not to investigate individual firms—so it makes sense to clean 
the data of individual and firm identities.  Therefore, we do not name individuals or 
firms we gathered data from anywhere in this study.  This is in keeping with the 
requirements imposed by the human-subjects oversight committees at NPS and 
UCI, requirements that are designed to protect individuals who contributed 
information to our study.  In a few places we do mention firms by name, but these 
are instances in which (unidentified) subjects named certain firms as industry 
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participants.  For example, in describing the private security contractor (PSC ) niche 
in the industry, a subject might say that “firms such as Blackwater” participate in that 
particular niche.  In these instances, naming of such firms is no more than “common 
knowledge” in the industry.  Therefore, when we quote from interviewees, we identify 
the interviewees by interview number only, rather than using the standard practice of 
identifying the name of the individual and the date of the interview. This, again, is in 
an effort to protect the anonymity of the participants.  In all cases where we refer to 
firms by name, this does not indicate whether personnel employed by these firms did 
or did not participate in the study.   
Phase 1: The Structured Interviews 
For the structured interviews, we drew on research practices that are well 
established in the field of strategic management, in particular in the work of cognitive 
researchers who examine how strategic managers think and make sense of the 
environment their firms work in.  Pioneer studies in this field include Reger and Huff 
(1993) and Porac et al. (1995).  We drew both on the underlying theoretical research 
model of these studies and on the research practices they used.  In terms of 
underlying theory, the basic argument cognitive researchers make is that human 
beings have bounded, rather than unlimited, cognitive capacity.  People, therefore, 
use a variety of heuristics (rules of thumb) and simplified models (often referred to 
as mental models) to make the task of understanding a complex industrial landscape 
more viable.  In essence, the argument these researchers make is that people pick 
out and focus on a few salient dimensions of the wider landscape because it’s 
impossible to efficiently comprehend it all.  The goal of the researcher is to discover 
what these mental models look like.  Past research in this tradition argues that there 
is often a surprising degree of uniformity in industry insider models both because 
human beings to some extent automatically use the same (obvious) signposts to 
navigate in an industry and also because managers are socialized into the industry 
landscape, i.e. they learn from others and by vicarious experience what the industry 
“looks” like.  
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The method used for researching insider mental models is structured 
interviews.  The interviewer elicits the subjects’ responses to various questions, and 
asks all subjects the same set of questions about the industry.  The responses are 
then transcribed, and the content is analyzed.  See Appendix A for the telephone 
interview instrument we used in this study, which was modeled on the research 
instrument used by Porac et al. (1995), and Appendix B for excerpts from the 
interview transcripts. 
Interview subjects are industry insiders that are chosen based on the 
assumption that they are “expert witnesses” in the industry (Reger & Huff, 1993).  
The expert witness criterion is key because it would not be useful to assemble data 
on the mental models of industry novices.  It takes time to learn and be socialized 
into industries, to understand the vocabulary and recipes of the industry.  Hence, 
tenure in the industry is an important criterion for interviewees.  The longer, the 
better.  In this study, our 19 subjects had on average over 20 years of combined 
experience as private military contractors and in uniformed military service, which 
more than meets the expert-witness criteria.  The sample was drawn from a variety 
of sources, mostly public, and supplemented by network contacts obtained via NPS 
faculty and students.  Details of the sample are in Table 1 below: 
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Table 1. Interviewee Data 
Interview # # of Pages 
Transcribed 































23 Director 6 None 
7 
2-28-09 6 a.m. 
 










29 Director 23 20 (Navy) 
10 
3-31-09 21 Senior VP 40 25 (Army) 
11 
3-19-09 31 Executive VP and 
CTO 















22 President 8 None 
15 




1-27-09 19 VP 2 None 
17 
3-16-09 19 Senior Security 
Coordinator 
18 8 (Marines) 
18 
4-4-09 21 Director 42 32 (Army) 
19 
4-8-09 17 Program Manager 40 30 (Air Force) 
Total 414 Total 389 years  
  Average 20.5 years  
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Phase 2: The Survey  
Survey research is used widely across all the social sciences to investigate 
phenomena, with varying degrees of effectiveness.  The survey we used in this 
study essentially aimed to collect information on five things: 
1. Demographic data that described each firm, such as its size, the prior 
experience of its employees, etc.  
¾ This generates information about the size distribution of firms in 
the industry.  
2. Data on the market niches in which firms are active, i.e., what kinds of 
work they generally undertake, for whom, and where.  
¾ This generates information about the general shape of activities 
in the industry to better describe the characteristic activities in 
the industry.   
3. Who firms think their competitors are. 
¾ This allows us to map the competitive networks that exist in the 
industry. 
4. Who firms like to cooperate with, and who they wouldn’t work with, i.e., 
their “in” and “out” networks. 
¾ This allows us to map the patterns of group affiliations that exist 
in the industry and where the break-lines are between groups of 
firms. 
5. Why firms do or do not like working with other firms. 
¾ Differences between these answers allow us to understand 
what drives the patterns of cooperation that are exhibited. 
A copy of the survey instrument we used is provided in Appendix C.  
The sample of firms we surveyed was drawn from our prior work on the 
demographics of the industry (Dew & Hudgens, 2008).  In that study, we identified 
approximately 550 named firms, about half of which were US based, and built a 
database of information on these firms.  In many cases, this data included 
information such as the names of key personnel in the firms including the founders 
or the CEO.  We drew on this list and supplemented it where necessary.  All of the 
firms we surveyed in this study were US-based.  In some cases, we sent surveys to 
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multiple subjects at the same firm in order to increase the likelihood that we would 
garner information on the firm from a subject. 
We used two methods to distribute the survey.  Our first distribution wave 
involved hand delivering surveys to approximately 30 firms in northern Virginia (the 
greater Washington, DC area).  Many private military contractors have offices in this 
area because of proximity to their key customers: various branches of the United 
States Federal Government.  Respondents were given a prepaid envelop in which to 
return the survey by mail.  In the second wave, we distributed surveys by mail.  A 
third smaller wave involved another round of mail distribution to the remaining firms 
for which we were able to obtain mailing addresses and contact information. This 
included new firms that were named in survey responses we received.  We added 
these firms to our mailing list. 
In total we distributed 311 surveys.  We received 61 responses at the time of 
writing this report, a response rate of 20%, which is within the normal range of 
response rates for survey research among organizations.  
C.  Analysis Techniques Used 
We used a mix of qualitative and quantitative methodologies to examine the 
data we collected.   
It is worth mentioning that the analysis we report here is preliminary—it is 
based on our initial look at the data, and we have not yet “mined” the data 
extensively for its deeper patterns.  However, our general philosophy about data 
analysis is that obvious patterns should speak out without having to manipulate the 
data extensively.  Therefore, what we report here are the obvious patterns and 
relationships we found in the data, and we expect these will probably remain the 
most robust findings even after (a) we collect a larger sample of surveys, which we 
expect to do by the end of October, and (b) we have had time to more extensively 
examine the data for its deeper patterns and relationships, which we expect to do in 
preparation for an academic paper based on this study. 
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The Qualitative Analysis 
¾ We started by reading all the transcripts and marking them up with 
their noticeable features.  Three of us performed this task, and we then 
shared our insights—a form of triangulation. 
¾ The information we distilled was used to populate several tables that 
we will present in the next section of the paper.  For example, we 
distilled the information collected from the interviewees on the category 
labels, which they had used to describe market niches in the industry, 
into a set of basic dimensions that described how firms vary in the 
private military sector.  Many of the category labels were based on the 
operational aspects of the industry.  Thus, we are able to present an 
“insider” view of niches in the industry based on their operational 
characteristics.  In addition, subjects described non-operational 
dimensions of firms, such as in which “end” of the market they are 
positioned, and factors that describe firms’ personalities, characters 
and identities. Our process for collapsing the taxonomies that subjects 
described into a smaller set, which we present in the data tables that 
follow, was iterative—we looked for synonyms that subjects used to 
describe elements of the industry and kept collapsing these until we 
reached a smaller number of dimensions that were unique, i.e., that 
could not be further collapsed. 
¾ In some cases, interviewees also populated the niches with a list of 
firms that participate in them.  When more than one interviewee gave a 
list of firms that were characteristic of a niche, we were able to 
triangulate the names.  We used this data to inform some analysis of 
networks in the industry, and also to triangulate against some of the 
survey data we collected. 
Survey Data Analysis 
¾ We first entered all the survey data into an online survey instrument 
(SurveyMonkeyPro).  We then downloaded the data into a spreadsheet 
format and analyzed some basic relationships between the responses.  
We used multivariate regression to test various relationships that we 
conjectured might exist within the industry.  Because we are still at this 
stage of our analysis, it is still very preliminary, involving looking for 
straightforward relationships that “speak for themselves” in the survey 
data. 
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III.   Data Presentation: Interview Data 
A.  Operational Segments Identified 
Research on managerial cognition strongly suggests that strategic managers 
have a fairly small repertoire of cognitive heuristics (rules of thumb) that they use to 
navigate an industry (Porac et al., 1995).  This finding is in contrast to the 
assumptions generally made in fields such as economics, which tend to take a much 
stronger view of human rationality, which, in turn, has implications for the information 
search and scanning behaviors expected of strategic managers (Forbes, 2007). 
Cognitive researchers argue that perceptual and economic factors usually reinforce 
each other, with the perceptual factors driving what is deemed as economically 
relevant in an industry (Reger & Huff, 1993).  In a series of papers, Porac and his 
colleagues did analysis that suggests that managers use four commonsense 
dimensions to categorize their rivals in an industry: 
1. Type of products and services sold,  
a. Are they selling the same stuff as us; i.e., are they in our selling 
“space”? 
2. Size  
a. Small/medium/large; these distinctions are not very fine-grained and 
tend to be relative to one another, rather than an absolute measure. 
3. Location/geography  
a. Where are they from?  Are they from the same place as us, or are they 
different?  Firms are expected to be fairly “local” and myopic in their 
assessments.  
4. Type of technology or “production” methods used  
a. For some industries this means the nature of the production methods 
firms use.  An example would be high/low quality manufacturing, based 
on the production method.  This largely defines the kinds of market 
niches in which a firm can sell. 
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Based on data we gathered from experts in the field, we created a series of 
PMC industry classifications that largely bear out the findings of prior research.  Our 
results are summarized in Table 2.  The majority of respondents in this study agreed 
that contrary to the public’s perception of PMCs inhabiting an industry of headline-
grabbing, machine-gun-toting firms, the vast majority of companies active in this 
industry, 80%-90%, are involved in some form of logistics support (often used as an 
umbrella term for activities that are not inherently security related).  Respondents 
generally saw the remaining 10%-20% of the industry as divided between training 
and security provision. These categories are further divided into sub-categories, as 
outlined in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Summary of Operational Segments 






Security 1. Static (slow) 
2. Moving (fast)  
- PSD 
- convoy 




6. Combat medical 












4.  Advisory: 
     reconstruction – 
     stabilization 
MPRI and DynCorp 





“DoD is producing all 





SAIC is the 
example 
 
EOD 1. Munitions destruction 
2. De-mining 










are shared with 
similar civilian 
operations 
Logistics Epitomized in the 
LOGCAP contracts 
between DoD and KBR 
KBR is the example
Base ops  Large- and small-scale 
facilities management, 
including austere and 
unfriendly environments 
KBR is the example
Maintenance Maintenance of weapon 
systems, aircraft 
platforms, ground 
equipment, and facilities 
Defense Support 
Services LLC (DS2)
Construction  Building facilities 
 
 
“CH2M Hill gets big 
things built.” 
 
As they described segments of the industry, interviewees often named 
various firms that they saw as typical of the sector, sometimes even listing names of 
firms that represented their perceived “players” in a particular segment.  We collated 
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this data and exhibit it in Table 3.  In the security segment, more than one participant 
clearly called out the names of the key firms participating in the segment. 
Table 3. Defined Clusters of Participants 
Segment Participants* 
Security Blackwater, Triple C, EODTech, DynCorp, SOC-SMG, 
Aegis, Reed, Olive, ArmorGroup 




MPRI, with DynCorp trying to reposition themselves 
mainly into this segment; PAE, Cubic; to some extent 
SAIC, Blacwater, Triple Canopy, Raytheon. 
Logistics KBR, Agility, DynCorp (emerging LOGCAP provider) 
Base operations KBR, Agility, PAE, AECOM 
Aviation Skylink, DynCorp, Evergreen Air, Airscan, Coldwater 
* Bolded names are firms that seem to define the segment. 
Two observations are worth making regarding the data presented in Table 3.  
First, there are defining firms in each niche/segment.  Certain firms are regarded as 
exemplars that “own” the territory in particular segments, presumably because of 
their market share, quality leadership, or media attention.  These are the “go to” 
firms in the segment.  Examples include MPRI for advisory services, SAIC for 
intelligence analysis, KBR for logistics and base support, and Blackwater for 
security.  (Note that for some segments, we have not yet figured out which is the 
defining firm based on the data we have). In this respect, the PMC sector, like any 
other industry, has its Kleenex (brand that defines tissues) and Coca Cola (brand 
that defines cola drinks) firms.  One might say that this is just the way in which 
human cognition and industries intersect: human cognitive processes involve 
typifying an industry according to its segment leaders. This doesn’t mean that these 
firms actually are the quality or market-share leaders in a segment, but the ways 
managers use heuristic shortcuts to segment an industry might make it seem as 
though that is the case.  
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Secondly, there is the issue of celebrity firms in the PMC sector—or, one 
might say, infamous firms. According to Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward (2006), 
“[F]irm celebrity arises as the media search for firms that serve as vivid examples of 
important changes in industries and society in general” (p. 52). The firm that the US 
media picked up was Blackwater, which has at various times—and among various 
audiences—been lauded or damned. Blackwater is interesting in part because it has 
become a defining firm not just for the security niche in the PMC sector, but for the 
whole sector.  It was the firm most mentioned by subjects in our study as they talked 
about the industry.  It is different from the other firms in that interviewees seemed to 
consider it an “ideal type” by which to define what other firms are and aren’t.   
B. Other Industry Dimensions 
Scale and Scope: “Anything needed to run a small city” 
As some of our respondents were quick to point out, private logistics firms 
have been part of the military landscape from Valley Forge to Napoleon to the World 
Wars to Vietnam. As highlighted by Porac et al., a standard way of differentiating 
among firms in a sector is size; this point came out nicely among our interviewees, 
who often differentiated among firms based on their role as  “big guys” or “small 
guys.” The “big guys” include KBR, Agility and PA&E (recently acquired by Lockheed 
Martin), while the “small guys” include Exploration Logistics, The Development 
Initiative, or Coldwater Aviation.  Table 4 provides a summary of this and other non-
operational ways of classifying the industry. 
Based on what subjects said, large and small contractors purportedly rely on 
different factors to survive in the sector.  Small contractors in this field rely heavily on 
their reputations and contact networks in order to get business (Interview 12-30-08). 
(In the words of one interviewee  “We depend very much on a network of contacts.”)  
Another interviewee pointed out, “Well, at our heart we are a human capital 
company. We have to go find tools, specific tools and talents to perform specific 
jobs. So, word of mouth and networks are extremely important to us to be able to 
find those people.” 
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Another said: 
And then contact network—one of the things that we do really well—has been 
a distinguishing factor for us—is our ability to recruit the right kind of people to 
do the work. Some of the larger defense contractors, we get into this space—
[your Lockheed and your Raytheon?]—don’t always have the right kind of 
resources to recruit, make sure you’re selecting the right kind of individuals to 
do this work. 
Though they cannot necessarily build a city for their client overnight, the 
strengths of the “little guys” lies in their flexibility as well as their specificity. They 
most often see themselves—and sell themselves—as best able to cater to client 
needs such as saving them money in the long-run. This is not the case for bigger 
contractors who seem to rely on different factors to compete.  Big contractors were 
differentiated by their proven ability to get large, complex jobs done.  Their 
experience in contract management also leads them to more often turn around to 
smaller, often local, subcontractors to execute the specific portion of those contracts.  
This gives them a broad international reach and access to talent worldwide.  
Sometimes these employees will follow the company from contract to contract and 
country to country, creating deep institutional memory as well as access to workers 
who have lower salary requirements than their American counterparts (Interview 1-
19-09).  This international hiring pool gives such firms an advantage when it comes 
to competitiveness in bidding for contracts.  According to one interviewee, “It really 
boils down to most of the cost in this business is labor, so the real challenge is to be 
able to attract good talent that can manage and do the work you want them to do, 
but yet at a fairly low price.  In other words, keep the labor costs down” (Interview 4-
5-09). 
Another edge that large firms have is liquidity.  One interviewee remarked 
that: 
[O]bviously, being big gives you the ability to financially support yourself.  One 
of the things in dealing with the US government is that they don’t pay on time, 
so there is many–a-time that companies actually float bills for the 
government.  Being larger obviously gives you a better cash-flow position or 
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revolving line of credit, depending on how you’re doing it, versus a smaller 
company where sometimes they can’t afford that. 
For the time being, interviewees see an apparent edge for larger companies 
in the logistics/support field.  However, this edge is not absolute.  One respondent 
went to great lengths to point out that the firm KBR actually enjoyed a good 
reputation until they started  hiring local contractors to build the facilities (in this 
case, showers), which broke down over time and started to electrocute US Service 
men and women.  Such incidents represent a threat to even large firms when 
competing for future contracts. Another interviewee chimed in: 
“Do you want to know the worst thing in this job? [...] TCN [Third Country 
National] management. That will send a contract…  that will destroy you. 
Because often times you are using an in-country recruiter and then all of a 
sudden…  show up all of these guys who…  don’t speak English or have 
Hepatitis. (Interview 11-25-08) 
Sometimes this can also lead to problems within the companies and between 
employees. Some of the earliest whistle-blowers on KBR were not necessarily 
employees motivated by righteous indignation at company practices; instead, they 
were employees disgruntled by their treatment by TCN managers (Interview 2-09-
09). Another interviewee told us that: “They have bad attitude; they have bad 
morale. I have seen just…there are lots of companies that have been sunk on 
contracts because of TCN management.” 
Personality: From “Real Companies” to “Two Guys with a Fax Machine” 
Similarly to logistics, there are large companies and small companies in the 
security domain.  Some security companies have thousands of employees but 
limited capabilities abroad, while some companies are small, highly specialized, and 
able to operate professionally in their particular niche, such as maritime security or 
personal protection services worldwide.   
One factor that most respondents deemed important was the background of 
the company founder or corporate officers. This finding regarding organizational 
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personality was one of the strongest findings we emerged with from the interview 
portion of our study.  According to one interviewee: 
each firm has a personality. That sounds funny but working with each firm is 
different, and I suppose the personality flows down from their senior 
management and how they want to do contractual relationships with 
employees, how they handle customers, and what is the type of work they are 
willing to go after. (Interview 11-25-08) 
Another said, 
Corporate culture is always driven by leadership. […] I would say that really 
the key is that the leadership within the organization define and pushes down 
through the management structure how they want that organization to be 
perceived and the level of professionalism that they want that organization to 
operate under.  
Executives from the firms surveyed in this project held a range of experience 
from Naval service to Army Special Forces to backgrounds in insurance and 
industry.  Corporate officers’ backgrounds significantly affect how they do business.  
Leadership backgrounds contribute to differentiations in the field by creating 
recruiting networks for companies, heavily influencing the type of employees that 
work for each company as well as short- to medium-term recruiting prospects.  As 
one interviewee put it, 
Well, they’re all the same in [that] they’re getting [the same] money. But aside 
from that, there are all sorts of various models, especially among those 
companies and what they personally can do and think they’re about, and their 
ethos.  Between a DynCorp and ArmorCorp, an Aegis or a Blackwater—
under an assumed name these days—or Triple Canopy, they all have a 
slightly different take and ethos…which kind of colors its approach to the 
various topics… So the character and flavor of their employee base pretty 
much affected how they would approach the various problems.  
In the minds of some respondents, founder background also has an influence 
on who is willing to hire a firm, with more than one respondent lamenting that 
European customers tend to shy away from hiring American companies for security 
work (Interview 12-15-08). 
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Quality: The “Race to the Bottom” 
As in the logistics field, employee pay in security-oriented firms also served in 
the study as a key indicator of the status of a firm.   Many respondents pointed to 
“Cadillac” firms like Blackwater or Triple Canopy, which hire many of their operators 
from groups like the elite US Navy SEALs or the Army “Delta Force.”  According to 
one interviewee, “It is the business model. We sell ourselves—because we don’t 
advertise or do that sort of thing—we sell ourselves on our reputation”   Such high-
end firms can be juxtaposed against firms such as Wackenhut or Securiguard that 
will hire “anyone off the street” to train in-house and then stand in front of buildings 
as low-end, static security.  Interviewees pointed to an important link between 
corporate leadership and quality, particularly in terms of maintaining discipline 
among contractors.  One told us, 
You’ve heard the cowboy mentality that goes on at some of these locations…  
There are stories that go on and on about—well, you know… people get out 
of control.  We don’t tolerate that…  And that comes right direct from the 
people who run the company and how it filters down….  It’s strictly 
management.  The employees are going to do what management will let 
them, or kind of if they turn their back like they don’t care—“boys will be boys” 
attitude. That’s where that problem comes in.  
Another interviewee stated a basic difference of principle between how 
private firms handle “bad behavior” by employees through contractual mechanisms 
versus other control mechanisms such as the law or professional norms: 
When a serious violation (violation of General Order #1, unethical behavior, 
violation of company or USG policy) occurs involving one of our personnel, 
the person will be on the next plane out of there and disciplinary actions 
taken. There is no tolerance for bad behavior.  In the case of minor infractions 
and personal performance issues, our program manager and team leaders 
will counsel the individual and monitor corrective actions.  If the lack of 
performance or bad behavior continues, the person is replaced.  
 
Though interviewees thought it easy to differentiate between “high end“ and 
“low end” security companies, within these firms there are significant cost pressures 
working at odds with firms’ cultures.  Competitive bidding environments force firms to 
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offer lower and lower wages, making staffing along their traditional networks more 
difficult. Paying low gives some firms an edge in bidding for contracts but also drives 
employee turnover at those same firms’ up as high as 300% annually (Interview 12-
12-08).  As one interviewee remarked, “a guy may work for Blackwater one week, 
and he may work for Triple Canopy the next week, and he may work for me the 
week after”  This is driving the quality of service that many of these companies can 
offer downward.  One interviewee complained, 
the government has managed to drive the wages down so far now that the 
military sort of guys that were going over there originally are like, “It’s not 
worth my life anymore.”  So, companies now have to go and find the sheriff 
from middle Georgia who worked in the sheriff’s department there for two 
years. Now he’s over in Iraq carrying an automatic weapon and guarding 
convoys with no real background in it. (Interview 12-15-08) 
For a summary of industry dimensions, see Table 4.  
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culture; “the firms 
have particular 
personalities” 
Senior mgt; driven top down; are 
very important; ideology 
subscribed to; operating 
philosophy subscribed to 
 
The “core mentality” of the 
organization 
MPRI is an army organization 
Triple Canopy is a Delta Force 
organization 
BW = founded on Seals 
mentality 
MVM = law enforcement-
based—has different philosophy 
(defensive) than military-based 
firms (offensive) 
Profile High profile vs. low profile 
1.  Backgrounders and 
Foregrounders 
2. low or high risk taking  
3.  type of operations undertaken 
(on the edge, or not) 
4.  kind of equipment used 
5.  offensive/defensive 
6. to some extent, size  
Blackwater = a celebrity firm 
 
BW = “whole army” 
Backgrounders serve the clients 
mission; foregrounders end up 
driving the mission   
Blackwater has become a 
foregrounder; our interviewee 
thought this unprofessional 
 
Quality 
Market “end” High end/low end 
 
Driven by training, ability, 
discipline, vetting, leadership, 
capability, equipment and budgets 
High end = Triple Canopy, BW, 
Hart, Dyncorp, Lockheed, L3, 
GD, NG, SAIC, and BAe 
Low end = Crescent Security, 
CACI, Mantech, CSC 
Professionalism 
 
In effect, refers to the 
professionalism of the individuals 
employed by the firm—hence to 
their hiring/vetting standards   
- Also leadership experience 
- Also organizational ethics 
 
Competency Whether or not the firm subscribes 
to standard/high quality TTPs 
(Tactics, techniques and 
procedures), i.e., has good rules in 
place 




Scale & Scope 
 
 
Size From large corporations to small 
mom & pop shops—2 guys and a 
fax machine 
From Wackenhut and G4S to 
mom & pop outfits rely on “ole’ 
boy’s” network 
Local/Intl Country of origin: UK, US, S. 
Africa, other 












Soup-to-nuts firms vs. firms that 
focus on thing.  Examples are 
DynCorp (soup-to-nuts) and 
Triple Canopy (focused).  
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C.  Sector Trends 
Both large and small firms see labor costs as driving future vertical integration 
in the field.  Many see work becoming more scarce with the withdrawal of US Troops 
from Iraq.  Small firms hope to tackle this issue through further specialization in 
niche markets while large firms are seeking to overcome this by competing on cost. 
Where the small firms might struggle to contain labor costs, it will give a competitive 
edge to larger companies with proven track-records and global reach. Those 
companies, however, face numerous problems in leveraging these advantages 
when it comes to quality control. This indicates that reputation for competency is 
important, especially to small firms. 
The decreasing number of highly qualified individuals who are willing to work 
at the going rates in austere environments—combined with a declining number of 
contracts that call for high-end armed security—is eating away at the differentiations 
among security firms that emerged in 2003.  Our interviewees suggested doubts at 
the sustainability of high-end firms—such firms are unlikely to compete to provide 
security guards for government buildings in the United States, but their niches in Iraq 
and elsewhere are drying up.  These firms will be forced to adapt or be run out of the 
field altogether.  Most importantly, these changes place stress on traditional 
recruiting networks and cultures in existing firms to conform to the new needs of the 
market.   Such difficulties may in part explain the sideways moves by firms such as 
Triple Canopy into training and advisory services. 
These training and advisory services can be classified into tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of training.  Tactical training could be something as 
simple as teaching soldiers and sailors how to use handguns before their 
deployments or teaching evasive driving for people working in conflict areas. 
Operational training could consist of conducting tabletop or full operational 
exercises, testing security procedures for departments and firms and bringing them 
up to speed. Strategic training involves designing doctrine, full security plans, or 
even entire government ministries.   Companies competing in the strategic realm are 
heavily invested in human capital.  Interviewees suggested firms such as CACI, 
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Booz Allen Hamilton, and MPRI are key players in this field.  These firms develop a 
certain kind of employee: a type of person who will, as one interviewee put it, “be 
able to go in to a ministry and operate with the minister and some of his senior 
subordinates” (Interview 12-30-08 10am).  This type of company is heavily 
dependent on existing networks in both governments and the military establishment 
to garner business.   
Some interviewee comments suggested that while strategic-training 
companies offer governments the ability to buy years of security experience, the 
future of this model is in question.  One informant warned of impending problems 
with the system: “As the military gets a little smaller and this crowd of folks reaches 
their ultimate retirement, where are (the companies) getting the feed to keep them 
running?” (Interview 4-1-09). These firms now face the problem of finding a way to 
replicate the success they have had with their human resources and contact 
networks thus far.  Many firms are looking to expand into humanitarian fields or with 
corporate preparedness, but thus far, such jobs make up a miniscule percentage of 
these firms’ current client portfolio.  However, interviewees seemed generally 
confident that training is a growth industry since there will most likely always be a 
need to improve the performance of everyone from soldiers to bureaucrats to NGO 
workers both during and after conflicts, disasters, and other complex emergencies in 
which these firms specialize. 
D.   Standing Back: Uncovering an Implicit Model for Niches 
in the PMC Sector  
As mentioned earlier, cognitive research in strategic management has 
focused on managers’ perceptions of their industry with a key part of their work 
being directed at understanding the cognitive simplifications managers make in 
order to ”organize” complex industry environments (Porac et al., 1995; Reger & Huff, 
1993).  The key point here is that people use shortcuts and that researchers may 
therefore learn something from examining the nature of these shortcuts. With this in 
mind, one of the analyses we did was based on tracking the dichotomies that 
subjects expressed in their comments about the industry, exhibited in Table 5.  
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These dichotomies are informative because cognitive theorists have argued that 
they are one of the key simplifications human beings use to organize their 
perceptions. Typical examples of dichotomies would be good/bad, tall/short, or 
smart/stupid. 
Table 5. Selected Dichotomies Expressed by Interviewees 
  Inherently Military Inherently Civilian  
Armed  Guns No guns 
Perspective viz “spear”  Front end  Back end  
Typifying activity Security (PSCs) Logistics (support services) 
Size Small Big 
Specialization Specialists Generalists 
Global  International (ex-pat basis) Local/TCN basis 
Illustrative firm Blackwater KBR 
 
What we see in Table 5 is a few of the dichotomies that were mentioned.  We 
chose these ones to illustrate the mapping of the industry because they are highly 
correlated dichotomies, i.e., subjects make generalizations about the nature of firms 
in the industry using a cluster of variables. Based on interviewee remarks, one could 
easily think that they cognitively orient themselves in the industry based on two key 
landmarks in the environment: Blackwater and KBR.  As Figure 1 illustrates, these 




Figure 1. Cognitive landmarks in the PM industry 
What cognitive analysis suggests is that in the process of simplifying their 
environment to make it more navigable, strategic managers group or cluster firms 
around common features or defining firms in the environment.  Blackwater and KBR 
seem to represent the “hubs” for such clustering. Therefore, at the simplest level, our 
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analysis suggests that industry participants organize the industry according to how 
much firms resemble KBR or Blackwater.   
Readers should note that we are not arguing that PMC managers only view 
firms with respect to how similar or dissimilar they are to KBR or Blackwater.  
Cognitive processes involve both simplification and elaboration.  Elaboration 
involves filling in the details that are missed by key simplifications, usually in ways 
that are at least consistent with the simplification the observer has in mind. 
Therefore, one should fully expect that PMC managers will cognitively elaborate the 
underlying signposts they use to navigate the industry, and, therefore, speak with 
great sophistication about their industry environment. Nonetheless, whatever 
fleshing out (elaboration) they do rests on the bare bones (simplification) of the 
underlying industry model they have in mind.  
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IV. Data Presentation: The Survey Data  
A.   Firm Size and Its Correlates 
The data in this section draws initially from questions 3, 4 and 7 in the survey, 
representing different measures of firm size.  In order to capture the size of firms in a 
way that a) elicits responses from firms concerned about privacy, and b) does so in 
a less taxing way for respondents, we created three variables for firm “magnitude” 
on a 1-5 scale. These variables are for Permanent Employees, Contract Employees, 
and Firm Revenue respectively.  Figure 2 exhibits descriptive data regarding the 
revenue ranges indicated by survey respondents. 
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We then correlated this data with the data we collected from the same firms 
on the number of permanent (p) and contract (c) employees, and also with a number 
of other variables we collected data on.  The correlations for this data are exhibited 
in Table 6. 
















The data indicates that revenues are strongly correlated with the number of 
permanent employees in firms (0.755, highlighted in yellow).  By contrast, use of 
contract employees was weakly correlated with both revenue (0.179) and also with 
permanent employees (0.159). This indicates that use of contractors is largely 
independent of other indicators of firm size, which gives this variable some value for 
exploring aspects of a firm that aren’t predicted by size per se.   
Other data are also interesting in Table 6.  In fact, as we will later, if one looks 
closely, there is a positive relationship between most variables and firm size. This 
corroborates interview respondents’ descriptions of a field with an increasing number 
of vertically integrated companies with multiple capabilities, bidding for contracts 
across the spectrum.  From Table 6 we see that size is positively correlated with 
PMCs that do business in the maintenance, aviation, construction and logistics niche 
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(i.e., firms that participate in these sectors tend to be bigger).  In contrast, training is 
(quite strongly) negatively correlated, indicating that firms that are training oriented 
tend to be smaller. 
Size also seems to matter when it comes to global reach. In Table 7, we see 
that in nearly every instance, operations outside the US were positively correlated 
with our size measures. This is logical and should come as no surprise.  One 
interesting area, though, relates to operations in Africa, which is most strongly 
correlated with the number of contract workers and most weakly correlated with 
revenue as well as in the lower third for number of permanent employees. This 
seems to indicate Africa is a niche market now.  Further investigation here would tell 
us more about the types of firms operating there and how this niche is developing.   
Table 7. Revenue by Area of Operation 
  Revenue Perm. Emp C.Emp 
opsUS -0.153 -0.141 -0.171 
opsEurope 0.296 0.132 0.178 
opsME 0.309 0.305 0.220 
opsSA 0.271 0.232 -0.009 
opsAsia 0.539 0.411 0.280 
opsAfrica 0.091 0.150 0.369 
opsLAm 0.180 0.108 0.073 
 
Figure 3 shows the mean scores for areas of operation.  For this figure, a 
score of 5 indicates that the firm works exclusively in the US; 4 indicates mainly US; 
1 indicates “None,” i.e., not part of their business.  11% (7 of 61) of survey 
respondents worked exclusively in the US. 80% said their operations were mainly 
US based. 
 








opsUS opsEurope opsME opsSA opsAsia opsAfrica opsLAm
 
Figure 3. Areas of Operations 
When looking at who firms hire, there is a strong hint that the larger the firm, 
the further they branch out from the stylized PSCs often highlighted in the media to 
firms with a global reach, hiring and offering a broader array of services than the 
“military inc.” idea suggests.  First, hiring employees with military, special operations, 
or law enforcement experience takes on less importance as firms get larger (see the 
correlation data in Table 8, which shows that these factors are negatively correlated 
with size). As the firms analyzed in this study grow, they tend to hire for a variety of 
different missions.  Smaller firms seem to focus more on niches such as EOD, 
medical, or training and seem to limit their hiring appropriately.   
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Table 8. Revenue by Who Firms Hire 
  Revenue 
Military Experience -0.113 
Spec Ops Experience -0.248 
Law Enforcement Exp -0.249 
Intelligence Exp  0.109 
Legal Exp -0.056 
IN-house Training -0.056 
Recruit US -0.317 
Recruit Europe  0.479 
Recruit Middle East  0.511 
Recruit South Asia  0.562 
Recruit Asia/Pacific  0.498 
Recruit Africa  0.161 
Recruit Latin America  0.068 
 
Secondly, Table 8 also shows that where firms hire employees from changes 
with size.  Hiring US employees is negatively correlated with size—as firms get 
larger, they hire more internationally.  This data is completely consistent with our 
interview data, in which TCN hiring practices (and the problems therein) were 
highlighted by participants.  However, overall, as Figure 4 shows, the hiring practices 
of US PMCs remain strongly US biased (note—a score of 1 on the survey indicates 
that a firm does not hire any employees from that region).  
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Figure 4. Regions that Firms Recruit Employees From 
Table 9 shows the relationship between firm size and who their customers 
are.  This data comes from question 8 in the survey.  The picture here is that as firm 
size increases, the likelihood that the firm does business with the big US agencies, 
NATO, NGOs and non–US-government agencies also increases.  This data should 
come as no surprise and, in fact, might be considered an indication that our survey 
responses are generally sound.  Of course, as size decreases it is more likely that 
firms are working for private citizens.
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Table 9. Size and Who They Work For 













B.  Customers that Firms Service 
Data on the customers that firms direct their services to came from question 8 
in the survey. Figure 5 shows the raw scores for survey respondents. 
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Figure 5. Customers Firms Direct Their Services To 
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In this chart, a score of 1 indicates that firms do none of their business with 
these customers, and 5 indicates they work exclusively for them.  Therefore, the low 
scores for “work for private citizens” and “work for the UN” tell a story about who is 
generally not in the client base of firms in our survey.  By contrast, a score of 3.5 for 
the “DoD” reflects that the average firm in the survey works “somewhat” (3) or 
“mainly” (4) for the US Department of Defense.  
We also examined the extent to which firms share customers by analyzing the 
correlations between different customers. For example, if a firm works for the DoD, 
how likely is it that they also work for NATO?  In fact, Table 10 indicates that there is 
a reasonable, negative correlation between working for the DoD and working for 
other customers with the exception of NATO, which gives us our highest positive 
correlation on the table.  This suggests that firms that work for the DoD tend to 
specialize in such work to the exclusion of working for a more diverse customer 
base. This result captures an important point: firms tend to be diversified in their 
service offerings (see the next section of the paper) but specialized in the customers 
they service.   
On the other hand, working for the US Department of State (DoS)  is 
positively correlation with working with most other customers.  Working for USAID 
seems to be most correlated with working for non-US-government entities as well as 
NGOs, a result that makes sense intuitively.   It also makes sense that the 
correlations between working for corporations and private citizens are reasonably 
strong.  These results are, in turn, negatively correlated with working for the DoD, 
which again indicates the existence of specialization in serving different customer 
types.  EOD/Demining has the strongest relationship with firms working for NGOs.  
In Table 10, we have highlighted several of the key correlations to enable readers to 
pick these out more easily. 
  
Table 10. How Much Firms Share Customers 
   WFDoD  WFDoS  WFUSAID  WFoUS  WFStates WFnonUSG Wfcorps  WFpvtctzn WFUN  WFNATO  WFNGO 
WFDoD  1.000  0.133  ‐0.134 ‐0.151 ‐0.006 0.164 ‐0.198 ‐0.1034 ‐0.23838 0.569641 0.166411
WFDoS     1.000  0.160 0.130 0.391 0.121 0.118 0.187249 ‐0.06375 0.272985 0.325468
WFUSAID        1.000 ‐0.102 0.182 0.309 ‐0.026 ‐0.0642 0.367635 0.124025 0.368599
WFoUS           1.000 0.069 ‐0.173 ‐0.069 0.173766 ‐0.33707 ‐0.04177 0.008883
WFStates              1.000 0.096 0.081 0.156694 ‐0.05993 0.041311 0.284073
WFnonUSG                 1.000 0.335 0.061296 0.375767 0.212531 0.196941
Wfcorps                    1.000 0.306646 0.284044 ‐0.00557 ‐0.05034
WFpvtctzn                       1.000 ‐0.14041 0.017206 0.04879
WFUN                          1.000 ‐0.085 0.08135
WFNATO                             1.000 0.335624
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Table 11. Who Firms Hire by Who Firms Work For 
  SkillsMil SkillsSpecOps SkillsLawE SkillsIntel SkillsLegal
WFDoD 0.397 0.259 -0.137 0.354 -0.054
WFDoS 0.161 0.325 0.325 0.170 0.311
WFUSAID -0.062 -0.088 0.189 0.017 0.128
WFoUS -0.044 0.225 0.190 0.354 0.275
WFStates -0.168 0.145 0.252 0.163 0.224
WFnonUSG -0.003 -0.044 -0.042 -0.016 -0.092
Wfcorps -0.270 0.012 -0.243 -0.332 -0.045
WFpvtctzn -0.011 0.341 0.100 0.120 0.087
WFUN -0.208 -0.293 -0.052 -0.336 -0.145
WFNATO 0.301 0.164 0.123 0.296 0.198
WFNGO 0.068 0.277 0.171 0.179 0.221
 
Since one way of thinking about PMCs is that they perform a “matching” 
service between end customers and labor (Spulber, 1998; 1999), we also looked at 
the type of employee skills associated with firms and the customers serviced by 
firms.  We report this data in Table 11.  Again, the notion of firms as “bodyshops” 
pops out in this data.  Not surprisingly, firms that work for the DoD employ personnel 
with military, special operations and intelligence backgrounds, whereas firms doing 
business with the DoS are more likely to employ personnel with special operations, 
law enforcement and legal backgrounds.  We also see higher correlations between 
intelligence skills and “Other US Government Agencies” (for example, the CIA).  
Overall, we think Table 11 strongly supports the conceptualization of firms as 
matching services 
C. The Diversified Service Offering of PMCs 
One of the findings in our prior research on the PMC sector (Dew & Hudgens, 
2008) is that the commonplace “tip of the spear” heuristic for describing the industry 
(popularized in Singer, 2003) hides a more complex picture of market niches in the 
sector.  Based on our analysis, the private military-contracting business is much 
more heterogeneous than previous accounts have stressed.  The sector is made up 
of different sub-sectors, which are probably better thought of as a patchwork quilt 
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rather than as elements up and down the spear.  This is particularly true for what is 
by far the largest category of firms that do military support work.  This contains a 
smorgasbord of sub-sectors, or niches.   
In question 9 of the survey, we collected data to examine the market niches 
firms operate in. Figure 6 illustrates the responses we received.    
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Figure 6. % Firms Involved in Different Market Niches 
This data confirms that firms in the industry are most frequently involved in 
support services such as intelligence, base operations, logistics, maintenance and 
repair, etc.   
Moreover, in our prior work, we suggested that firms tend to work in a variety 
of different niches at once and that even this hides the degree of latency in the 
industry since firms may have the potential of switching into other niches given the 
resources at their command.  The diversification of firms—and the even higher 
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degree of latent diversification—partly explains the adaptability of the PMC sector as 
a whole since firms readily switch between market segments and activities, 
depending on client demands.  This switching was also in evidence in our interview 
data, in which interviewees showed an acute awareness of “where business is 
heading” in the sector, i.e., where the next big contracts are to be had.  Figure 7 
shows the average number of market niches firms operate in (that responded to our 
survey). 
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Figure 7. Frequency Count of Number of Services Offered 
Figure 7 captures the average degree of diversification among firms. The 
number of niches ranged from 1 to 9 (horizontal axis). The modal (most frequent) 
response is 4 segments/niches, and the average is 4.1 (horizontal axis).  In our data, 
only 8 firms (13%) were “pure plays” in the sense that they operate in a single niche 
in the sector.  87% of firms operate in more than one niche, and 2/3 of firms operate 
in four or more niches.  Thus, the industry does appear to be diversified.  
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D. Why Firms Cooperate 
In this section, we report data on questions 15 and 18 in the survey: why firms 
choose to cooperate or not cooperate with other firms. Firms active in different 
segments of the industry were generally homogenous with regard to the factors they 
highlighted as important in cooperating with other firms. The only exceptions were 
found in the responses of firms that do a lot of their business in training.  These firms 
showed reasonably strong correlations between not wanting to work with firms that 
were “high profile,” “not careful,” had poor employee quality, or “can’t get the job 
done.”  It is possible that training firms are just more forthcoming in their criticisms of 
other firms.  It is also possible that this result is a genuine one that is consistent with 
the following: training-oriented firms are more selective in the firms they partner with 
because their training focus incorporates a set of professional values that esteem 
highly effective military professionals who do their work below the radar screen.   
Figure 8 indicates the raw scores (relative to the mean score) regarding the 
factors firms consider important in selecting partners to cooperate with.  Note that 
“professionalism” and “ability to get the job done” are ranked highest.  Interestingly, 
whether firms also compete with one another is not considered important, which is 
consistent with the observation that the industry is dynamic and “liquid,” meaning  
alliances shift quickly, the industry is incestuous, and firms that compete for 
contracts often end up subcontracting with each other in order to fulfill them.  
 - 40 - 
Factors affecting cooperation between firms









































































Note that professionalism, qualified 
employees and get the job done = 
important criteria, but low profile is not 
important at all.  Of course, these 3 
issues are linked issues.
 
Figure 8. Factors Affecting Cooperation Between Firms Differences  
vs Mean Scores, With +VE Scores Indicating Key Criteria 
Figure 9 indicates the raw scores (relative to the mean score) for survey 
respondents on why they would avoid cooperating with another firm.   
Factors making firms AVOID cooperating with a firm










































































Legal issues, lack of professionalism, bad 
administration, not being careful, poor employees, 
can't get the job done = key criteria for avoiding 
cooperation with other firms
 
Figure 9. Factors Making Firms AVOID cooperating with a Firm Scores vs  
Means; High +VE Scores Indicate the Key Criteria that Matter 
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We ran correlation analysis on the panel of responses in Figures 8 and 9 in 
order to examine the factors that tend to be correlated with one another.  Not 
surprisingly, “lack of credit problems” and “lack of legal problems” are highly 
correlated, as is “know-well” and “worked before” with a firm.   
It is interesting to note the reasonably high correlation between “know-well” 
and “low-profile.”  What does this tell us about what it means to be "known" in the 
field?  It seems to suggest that respondents’ opinions about how low profile a firm is 
are colored by how well they know the firm.  This would be consistent with insiders 
being knowable about which firms try to stay low profile, though media attention 
might make them high profile.  Thus, outsiders who don’t know a firm might see it as 
high profile, whereas knowledgeable insiders see the same firm as low profile.  
Quality of employees and professionalism are reasonably well-correlated 
criteria for selecting partners to contract with. 
Not surprisingly, there is a significant correlation between “quality employees” 
and “good admin” and between “bad admin” and “not professional.”  These are 
consistent with the numerous mentions in the interview data we gathered about how 
corporate culture is set from above and, thereby, can be linked to problems in the 
field (when such problems occur).  It is also consistent with the interview data on 
hiring practices, which highlighted that firms that are well administered (i.e., 
professionally led) tend to have tighter screening processes for employees they hire.  
In all cases, these correlations seem to reflect interviewee remarks suggesting the 
industry is tightly networked and that networks run largely along the lines of 
professional affiliations, i.e., that prior military or security qualifications are important, 
not just as a quality stamp but also as an entry ticket to the professional networks 
that put people into jobs in PMCs. 
There is a high correlation between “price too low” and “bad credit” that needs 
little explanation except to say that this is typical across many industries, not just 
among PMCs. 
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“Legal issues” understandably correlates with perceptions such as “high-
profile,” “not careful,” and “not professional.”  This is consistent with the interview 
data that links all these together for a few firms (in particular, the image of 
Blackwater) that have had problems in Iraq.    
In Figure 10 we have summed the responses to why firms cooperate and why 
they don’t cooperate in order to provide a crisper image of the key criteria that stand 
out when firms are talking about what matters to them in their own industry.  We 
think this is potentially an interesting insight: by asking firms to tell us why they 
would cooperate or not, we are gathering information about what criteria they use for 
evaluating other players in the industry.  Interpreted this way, the data presents a 
number of interesting observations about the mental models PMC managers have 
regarding the industry. 
































































Note that respondents say that 
whether the firms have a prior 
relationship is not a major factor in 
firms' decisions about whether or 
not to cooperate
Professionalism and getting the 
job done are the key criteria 
respondents think are used to 
determined cooperation between 
firms
 
Figure 10. Summed Scores for Why Cooperate, or Not 
Finally, we should mention that there are a few factors that appear to have 
some influence on how many firms a given firm will contract with, though none are 
very strong.  The strongest predictors that a firm will do more partnering are heavy 
involvement in training and working for the DoD (0.332 for both).  Firms that score 
 - 43 - 
highly on these measures report higher numbers of firms with which they co-
contract.  Firms that place a higher value on intelligence experience in employees 
also report more partners (0.283). In all these cases, one might conclude that the 
use of collaborative arrangements with other firms is a mechanism for fulfilling 
contracts, i.e., firms routinely subcontract with others.  The extent of subcontracting 
is probably higher for the DoD work because of the large scale of the contracts; for 
training-oriented firms and those that hire a lot of intelligence employees, the driving 
factor might be that firms rely heavily on networks of contractors to fulfill these type 
of roles.  These are the “bodyshop” type of firms. The size of a firm’s permanent 
employee base had little effect (0.072) on the number of companies they reported as 
having worked with in the industry.  
Firms that reported more contracting with other firms were more likely to 
emphasize partners that price appropriately in their survey responses.  Also, as they 
co-contract more, firms say they avoid firms they deem “not careful.”  This is 
corroborated on the other side by firms with a high number of partners who say they 
avoid “careless firms” (0.282).
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V. Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, we would like to suggest that there are several 
directions for future research that emerge from the work presented here.  First, we 
have only reported the results of parts of the survey; two other sets of data that we 
collected in the survey remain to be analyzed in future work.  One is respondents’ 
remarks in the last part of the survey, in which we asked about the future of the 
industry.  This data might be coded and used to generate an informed picture of 
where industry insiders think the industry is going next.  In such a fast-paced and 
turbulent industry, such results are no doubt perishable, but also useful in 
understanding the direction of the industry for the foreseeable future. 
A second set of data we collected in the survey is information on firms’ 
relationships with other firms—who they do (and don’t) business with.  This data set 
is ripe for network analyses to understand how firms cluster in the industry.  What 
can we learn by examining the “in” and “out” networks of firms, from mapping 
patterns of cooperation and affiliations that exist in the industry?  Network theorists 
generally argue that such affiliations represent some kind of screen or filter.  
Fundamentally, the claim here is that it is easier to observe who firms are affiliated 
with than it is to observe their quality.  Therefore, affiliations are the coin of the realm 
for signaling a firm’s attributes.  This means that firms will seek out high-status 
affiliations in order to suggest their quality (and hence influence customer willingness 
to pay, which enables them to price higher and make higher profits).  This might 
mean affiliations with high-status customers (such as the DoD) and/or high-status 
suppliers (such as special operations personnel), as well as affiliations with other 
PMCs that are seen as brand enhancers.  In short, the hypothesis here is that the 
social structure of the industry may strongly influence the perceived quality of firms 
in the industry.  There is plenty of room to examine the nature of PMC networks in 
order to better understand how these affiliations work to create value in the industry, 
make some firms successful, etc.  In particular, the upstream (customer) and 
downstream (supplier, in this case labor) affiliations of firms have been less 
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examined in terms of their signaling value, but they would be very relevant to look at 
using this data set. 
Along with analysis of the survey data, the interview data we collected could 
be subjected to further analyses.  So far, we think we have merely skimmed the 
surface of analyzing the data.  This data bank is ripe to be worked on, and could 
also be combined with some elements of the survey data in order to produce more 
cohesive overall findings. All this remains for future work. 
Lastly, in part four of the paper, we highlighted one way of thinking about 
PMCs:  they perform a “matching” service between end customers and labor. In 
colloquial terms, practitioners refer to such firms as  “bodyshops” (Bartlett & Steele, 
2007). This notion provides a number of useful insights into the PMC industry in 
general that could be further developed empirically by a detailed analysis of 
elements of the survey data in this study, as well as developed conceptually by 
drawing on Spulber’s work on the topic (both popular and academic—Spulber, 1998; 
1999).  This would enable readers to better understand what exactly the service is 
that PMCs provide (i.e., how the industry adds value) by seeing the common threads 
between PMCs as providers of the same kinds of underlying services as Wal-Mart 
does in discount retailing (a supermarket that reduces the transaction costs in 
military services) or Carmax does in used-car sales (a quality screening and 
guaranteeing service). 
Finally, it is worth reiterating that our primary objective in this paper is to help 
our audience (mainly acquisition professionals in the DoD) do their jobs better by 
developing a comprehensive picture of the PMC sector, which up until now has been 
lacking.  The basic rationale for this approach is that before one can make informed 
choices about what services to acquire from whom, one needs to understand the 
industry playing field, i.e., have a more comprehensive overview of the players  
 
 
involved and the landscape of the sector.  With such knowledge in hand, it is 
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possible to conduct a contracting process that obtains better value for the public 
taxpayer.  Since there seems to be no general abatement in the use of PMCs, better 
comprehending the sector’s wide variety of market segments and players remains 
an important issue to which we hope this study makes some contributions.   
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Appendix A.  
Telephone Interview Instrument 
Start-up Remarks 
1. Thank you for being willing to spend a little time talking to me. 
2. I wanted to let you know that it’s protocol in any study like this to keep 
all data confidential and to ensure that interview data cannot be traced 
back to particular interviewees.  So I wanted to make you aware of 
this. 
3. Next, I wanted to mention that I’m going to keep notes on the interview, 
and in order to make that easier, if it’s okay with you, I’d like to record 
the interview.  Is that okay? 
4. It’s also protocol for me to mention that you can stop the interview 
anytime you want to. 
5. Okay, then, let’s start. 
Part 1: Your Organization 
1. If I could, I’d first like to collect some background information. 
2. What’s your title and role: what do you do?  How long have you worked 
for X firm?  
3.  What did you do before that?  And how many years experience would 
you say you have working in security/military roles in total? 
4. When was your company founded? 
5. Where is your company’s official HQ location? 
a.    Do you have any other offices? 
6. Roughly how many employees do you have? 
a.    Permanent 
b.    Contract
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7. Can you indicate roughly what your annual sales revenue is? 
a. More than $1MM 
b. More than $10MM 
c. More than $100MM 
d.    More than $1BN  
8.         Is your company publicly or privately owned? 
9.        Who founded your company and what was their background? 
10 Next:  I’m interested in understanding your organization.  So, can you 
tell me about your what your firm does?  Who are your employees and 
customers?  Where do you do work?  What kinds of services do you 
offer? 
11  Prompt specifics:  How would you generally describe what your 
company does? What does your company specialize in? 
12 What type of services does your company offer?  
¾ (Examples/prompts) 
a. Protection services/operational support 
b. Consulting/analysis 
c. Training 
d. Logistics/facilities services 
e.    Other 
13 If protection services, what kinds of things do you do? 
¾ List of options: facilities protection, convoy protection, close 
protection of individuals, dog teams, etc. 
14 (Does your company offer training and/or have training facilities?  What 
type?) What type of training and training facilities does your company 
offer? 
15 Does your company provide any advisory or analytical services? What 
kinds of things do you do? 
a. Auditing/analysis 
b. Planning and strategy 
c. Other
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16 Does your company provide any support services? 
a. Aviation support 
b. Tactical equipment 
c. Intelligence surveillance and information 
d. Medical support 
e. Command, control, and communications 
f. Crisis support 
g. Investigations 
h. Equipment maintenance 
i. Logistics 
j. Base operations 
k. IT/IS services 
l. Administrative services 
m. EOD/de-mining 
n. Other 
17 In what regions of the world does your company operate? 
¾ Country list 
18 Who, in general, are your clients?   
a. Private sector    (many/few) 
b. Government departments (many/few) 
c. International organizations (many/few) 
d. NGOs    (many/few) 
e. Private Individuals  (many/few) 
19 Which clients do you do the most business with? 
20  In what regions of the world are your clients located? 
¾ Country list. 
21 I am also curious about your employees.  What prior work experience 
do your personnel tend to have? 
a. Military (Army, Air force, Navy, Marines) 
b. Special operations 
c. Law enforcement 
d. Intelligence services 
e. Commercial 
f. Other 
22 What nationalities do you employ? 
23 Are most of your employees full-time or contracted? 
24 What would you say are the other critical resources your company 
depends on, other than employees?  Prompts: 
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a. Company reputation 
b. Management talent 
c. Status/rank of management/key employees 





End of PART 1. 
Part 2: The Market 
1. Starting question: So, are there different types of firms in the sector, or 
are firms pretty much all the same?  How would you say the sector 
was segmented? What are the most important differences between 
firms? 
(Hopefully the interviewee will say something like:  “Well, there are lots of 
different types of firms in the industry—firms that do PSC work are very different 
from firms that run facilities, or ones that do information analysis, for instance.”) 
Follow-on question:  Well, how many different segments would you say there 
are?  What segments are there? 
Interview response. 
Follow-on question: So, within the X segment you just mentioned, are there 
further differences between firms, or are all X firms the same? 
And so on.  Interviewer asks the same follow-on question until the interviewee 
says there are no more differences between firms in that segment.  Then, the 
interviewer goes back to previously mentioned segments, and asks the same follow-
on questions for those, until all segments have been exhausted. 
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Other Prompts: 
1. What are the differences between companies that offer similar services 
as you? (Refer to interviewee’s previous answers.) 
2. Do you consider there are any differences between companies by 
virtue of the employee pool they draw on?   
3. ...between companies that provide this type of service? 
4. ...between companies that operate where you operate? 
5. ...between companies that service this type of clientele?  
Competitor Question: 
1. Finally, who do you consider to be your most important competitors?  
2. Why do you think these firms particularly competitive with you? 
Final Question:  About the Future 
1. What do you think the future holds for the industry?  How do you think 
the industry is going to evolve?  What do you think are the critical 
drivers of this evolution?  
End of PART 2. 
Interview Close 
1. Is there anything else you’d like to mention before we close? 
2. I’d like to thank you for your time and for sharing your thoughts with us.  
3. I’ll be sending you a copy of my notes on the interview so you have a 
record of what we talked about. 
4. If you have any follow-on queries, you’re welcome to contact me by 
phone or email—you have my contact details. 
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Appendix B 
Excerpts from PMC interviews 
¾ Yes.  Corporate culture is always driven by leadership.  I would say that really 
the key is that the leadership within the organization define and pushes down 
through the management structure how they want that organization to be 
perceived and the level of professionalism that they want that organization to 
operate under.  
¾ And the military just does not have the breadth and depth to continue to move 
in [to Africa] and to expand.  They are going to have to rely on contractors to 
do that.  Especially as long as they maintain the point that it is humanitarian in 
nature and not military.  The best way to do that is to do it with contractors. 
R1: Why is that? 
¾ Visibility.  They want nothing less than to have a lot of military uniforms 
running around on the African continent, because it starts to look very much 
like a military operation at that time rather than a humanitarian relief 
organization.  I think you’d get a lot of push-back from the Department of 
State as well if they started to do that. 
¾ Yeah, well, I mean, we depend very much on revenue; we depend very much 
on profit—maintaining a profit margin, growing business at a certain 
percentage each year. We depend very much on a network of contacts.  
I1: But, a reputation, if you’re asking me about what facets are important to me 
within a company in order to grow it…that makes sense. Reputation—very, 
very important. Repeat customers—very, very important. And, I mean, that 
helps with your reputation, doing good work every time. Having a strategic 
vision…  insuring that you push that strategic vision down to every employee 
so as you move forward everyone understands and they work in lock [?] step.  
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¾ Competency is something that other people can’t easily do, your specialty, 
and it makes you unique and it grows your business; whereas, a capability is 
something that a lot of different people do. 
[On what makes firms competitive with this small firm -] 
¾  Just their size, access to resources, access to large amounts of money. You 
see, our…we are in an interesting situation because we are…we were a small 
company and we still are. But, because we were purchased by **** 
inadvertently we have the pull of a large company, So, we can’t go for any of 
the small-business contracts that most people our size would win now 
because we have to go after contracts that the Booz Allens of the world and 
the Northrup Grummans of the world are going after. 
¾ and that’s, that’s a very hard problem to solve. So, as we move forward with 
technology—and technology is moving much quicker than our ability to 
protect ourselves, so [inaudible] with continue to grow, I guess is what I’m 
saying. We positioned ourselves here because we believe that the IT security 
market will continue to grow, and, again, that’s just based on protection of 
information. How do you store and protect information from an invisible 
enemy? You have to name [?], you have to n—you have to be connected, 
right?  
¾ Most of our permanent employees, well, all of them, I believe. Most of our 
contractors are, the largest percent are, local or third-country nationals.  
¾ Well, at our heart, we are a human capital company. We have to go find tools, 
specific tools and talents to perform specific jobs. So, word of mouth and 
networks are extremely important to us to be able to find those people.  
¾ I1: Sure, I mean you can have a high-end firm like a Blackwater, or a 
ridiculously low-end firm like Crescent, and everything in between. 
R1: What makes a high-end firm a high-end firm? 
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I1: The skill and the training of the people they employ, the leadership that 
supervises them—that leads them. Certainly the success of their missions, of 
their contracts that they provide. Their ability to work in dynamic environments 
and to work comfortably. 
R1: Okay. What are hallmarks of a low-end firm? 
I1: A complete lack of discipline, a lack of vetting, lack of training, severe lack of 
leadership, not understanding the environment in which they are working.  
 
[in response to the question about problems the informant observed amongst 
construction contractors -] 
¾ No, no, I mean leadership is the main current, but certainly it is more difficult 
to do logistics in East Africa than it is in, well it is probably more difficult in 
East Africa than it is in Baghdad. It is probably more difficult in Afghanistan, in 
Kabul, than it is in Baghdad, or certainly in the outskirts. So, to some extent it 
is geographical, but I think it is a mix of geography and leadership.  
¾ I guess to some extent it is all of that, but really it comes down to the 
interaction between the leadership of their people and the leadership of the 
people whom they would serve. You can truly tell the difference of who’s got 
more experience at all of this if you are in the room with different levels of 
groups of people. Totally. So, yes maybe it is the way they advertize, maybe it 
is the way they don’t advertize. Maybe it is some sort of whatever, savoir faire 
that they might demonstrate…sort of very…sort of clear understanding of 
what they are doing, they exude an experience that you might not find. So 
yeah. (p. 13) 
¾ I mean, KBR is a fantastic…I mean the reason why everyone is digging [?] 
over there every day is because of KBR. I think where you run into trouble is 
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when you sub-contract to some of the local firms that were starting to just be 
able keep some of that economy in the country. (p. 14) 
(on the topic of Medical Support) 
I1: Same there. It’s usually wrapped into something else that we’re doing. So, we 
have to have a clinic, for example, for the Baghdad embassy security force. 
We have to run a small clinic. 
R1: Now, is that a requirement for gaining the contract, or was that part of the 
contract? 
I1: It was something that evolved. What happened over there in general work 
contractors is that there were obviously a lot of contractors over there doing 
various things, and they were all going to the CASH [?], the military hospital, 
for everything from colds to obviously much more serious injuries, and the 
CASHes were getting overwhelmed,  And so what happened was the 
government started helping some contractors stand up their own clinics to do 
routine day-to-day care to their employees so that they weren’t overloading 
the military hospital. And, granted, it was quite hard for the government to 
figure out a way to charge the contractors for that. 
¾ That’s one of the things that—[you’re getting really ?] close to my marketing 
brainwashing here—that the key thing for ******* is that the company has 
developed a good reputation and it wants to keep that reputation as a high 
quality company within this market space. The management talent obviously 
falls in that as well because we have management people here, particularly 
the ones on the operations side are individuals of significant amount of 
experience in the military—special operations, Delta Force, what have you. 
So, if you look at companies in this space and you add up the number of 
years in the military, if you take our key management personnel and add them 
up, we’re heads and shoulders above a lot of the other companies as far as 
experience in this space goes. (p. 17) 
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¾ And then contact network—one of the things that we do really well, has been 
a distinguishing factor for us, is our ability to recruit the right kind of people to 
do the work. Some of the larger defense contractors, we get into this space—
[your Lockheed and your Raytheon ?]—don’t always have the right kind of 
resources to recruit, make sure you’re selecting the right kind of individuals to 
do this work. (p. 17) 
¾ Well, I think it’s the changes by the government, and then secondly, it’s the 
draw-down, the change in the landscape of Iraq because there are a number 
of companies who, for a number of years, had a significant amount of work in 
Iraq and that’s probably going to start to decline. So, you’re going to see 
companies consolidating both to maintain market share and also—more 
likely, maybe, than even maintaining market share—diversify themselves so 
that they do other things across the [service offering ?].  
¾ So, you might see a company that does security work want to get into mine 
and ordinance disposal or get into the kidnap and ransom consulting so that 
they have different business arms [?] and they’re not totally dependent on the 
protective security work that they’re maybe doing in Iraq. (p. 11) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
¾ The US government is very lax in putting other things into their contracts 
besides to say that we want twelve guys with guns to be a torch for this 
convoy.  There’s more to it than that in that you’ve got to have housing for 
these guys; you have to have food for these guys; you have to have medical 
for these guys; you have to have all the various things, you know, laundry 
services for these guys—all those types of things that you have to have 
[inaudible]…all these things you have to have that the government inherently 
has with the military.  Private security companies focus a lot more on 
providing funds support for personnel and not so much on providing the 
support type services, so they tend to get caught short or try to rely on the 
government to provide those services for them. 
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¾ It’s the same pool of people that they’re hiring from—so the only real 
differences between them is who owns the company and how much they’re 
paying.  You know, but the talent that they use, the actual resources, the guys 
on the ground.  A guy may work for Blackwater one week, and he may work 
for Triple Canopy the next week, and he may work for me the week after. 
¾ One company was having trouble finding qualified people to staff it.  No 
matter how much they were paying, they just couldn’t find the talent to 
actually staff it, so they ended up losing the contract to another company that 
underbid them and said, “Yes, yes, we’ll be able to find the talent.” And now, 
that company is either…they are paying less than the previous company, and 
they’re still having trouble finding personnel, so they’ll probably lose the 
contract.  In Iraq, it’s a unique scenario to us from what we’ve seen in that in 
Iraq, the government has managed to drive the wages down so far that 
companies are now having trouble finding…where when Iraq first kicked off 
you had a lot of former military, former special operations guys going over 
there and making a lot of money and everything else. But the government has 
managed to drive the wages down so far now that the military sort of guys 
that were going over there originally are like, “It’s not worth my life anymore.”  
So, companies now have to go and find the sheriff from middle Georgia who  
worked in the sheriff’s department there for two years. Now he’s over in Iraq  




I1: No.  Nor, by the way, did *******.  And that was because I chose not to get into 
those areas.  We had lots of opportunities to do that, but it was not our 
mainstream, it wasn’t our lane.  As we looked at this we thought, you know, 
we could get into electronics, we could get into vehicles, and we could get 
into specialty avionics, and just decided we didn’t want to go there.  We did 
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have all those things that were required in order for us to do our job.  So, we 
had armored cars, but we weren’t an armored-car company selling armored 
cars.  We provided armored cars as part [of] a protection detail.   
 (On the difference between who you recruit for what) 
¾ For security services, they are interacting a lot more with the public. They are 
domestic. They are working at embassies. So it is a different type of guy. 
Sure, you get guys who were in the military, but maybe they got out, maybe 
they did 6-8 years of civilian law enforcement. The difference between a cop 
and a soldier: the first thing a soldier is going to do is draw a gun, absolute 
first thing. The last thing a cop is going to do is draw his gun. The soldier will 
draw his gun to hold you at bay. As soon as the cop draws his gun, you are 
shot. That is just how they think. So utilizing police officers is much better in 
sensitive situations because they will try to talk a situation down before they 
escalate it. And I would say, in my opinion, soldiers escalate it because they 
will pull them for [inaudible]. So different level of education, different level of 
temperament, so they all come from different backgrounds. Most guys end up 
coming from having some military at some point. Until you get into much more 
of the consulting and advising roles—let’s say security-sector reform work, 
where you are actually educating police officers and lawyers—how do you 
change the situation in a sector? And you end up getting a whole bunch of 
cops who do that. 
¾ We spent a lot of years as a small firm so the CEO is very stringent on 
investment vehicles. It is awful hard to get the ability to invest and start new 
things. [inaudible] and so it works. A lot of these services…it is kind of 
interesting, we never planned on getting into security. We went to Iraq to do 
the ammunition disposals, [sit on the end ?]…there was just so much stuff 
that we were blowing up—200-300 tons a day for 3 ½ years. When we first 
got there, the army branch nearest said, “well, it was contracted that they 
would provide our security” and 20 days in they said, “hey, we’re not going to 
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provide you security, you have 15 days to figure it out.” So, we hired another 
firm, initially for 2 months, and then we decided that we could probably stand 
on our own, and this was back in ’04. We stood up our own, and it ended up 
being an extreme growth market for us—up to a third to half of our revenue 
now. 
¾ Credit lines. The US State Department might pay you in 60-90 days—you 
would be lucky if the UN pays you in 9 months. So, just think about it. You are 
standing up a 200 man job, and you are not going to get paid for 2 months. 
You are going to be looking a $1 million of payroll a month, at least. 
I1: Do you want to know the worst thing in this job?...TCN management. That will 
send a contract; that will destroy you. Because often times you are using an 
in-country recruiter and then … show up all of these guys who really, actually 
don’t speak English, or have Hepatitis. And so you’ve got that issue—are you 
getting decent, healthy, appropriate individuals from your in-country 
recruiters. Then, you actually have to work a lot of the…that’s just the 
language of the problem. Then, you have to work out the nationality issues. 
****, they hire El Salvadorians and Hondurans and put them on the post 
together, and they start shooting at each other because they hate each other. 
So, you’ve got national issues. You’ve got menu issues—you need to feed 
them what they like eating. Food is a huge morale issue, so you need to 
just…I think in our chow hall, we serve 4 cuisines. We serve American, we 
serve Halal, we serve…[we go get something they like eating ?], we make it. I 
can’t remember what the fourth one is. But, it’s like an Asian cuisine thing for 
the support workers. And that is where you are going to go south because—
there is no nice way to say this—you get what you pay for. When you are 
paying $30 a day, you are not going to get a squared-away US operator. You 
are going to get a Northern African previous soldier. When you get good 
ones, awesome. You are always going to get your 10%. That’s why a lot of 
guys talk about their 10%, and it also applies to US and OCN’s as well as 
TCNs where they are just not good. They have bad attitude; they have bad 
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morale. I have seen…just there are lots of companies that have been sunk on 
contracts because of TCN management. 
¾ [E]ach firm has a personality. That sounds funny but working with each firm is 
different, and I suppose the personality flows down from their senior 
management and how they want to do contractual relationships with 
employees, how they handle customers, and what is the type of work they are 
willing to go after. So, you might be able to say that it comes down to 
overhead because how much are they going to pay, and how much senior 
management are they going to put on the ground. 
¾ It would be because you have a whole bunch of people coming back, and this 
is one of my major concerns: I have been focusing on Africa for the last 
couple of years. I don’t go to the Middle East anymore. And standing up 
operations there, I can’t use guys from Baghdad because they have the 
wrong temperament. So you can’t really use many US guys because a lot of 
US guys can’t handle being in Africa because a lot of time you are unarmed. 
The Brits have this strange mentality where they are expeditionary. They go 
out and they drink tea, sitting in the middle of a rebel village. [And for some of 
those guys it ends up working out ?]. But I’ve got, I don’t know, about 450-900 
US guys that, if Iraq stands down, I am not going to be using them in 
Southeast Asia and Africa because they are just not the right guys. A few of 
them will be, but not all of them.  
¾ I like to point out that in March of 2007, you know, I think there were more 
academics studying this topic than Westerners actually doing gunned 
security.   
¾ I mean, everybody reports there’s what—200 or 300 security companies that 
are active, which may be accurate, but probably 90% of them are two people 
and a fax machine and a cell phone.  [inaudible_________], things like that.  
So, they don’t really count. 
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¾ There’s just limited use of private security for humanitarian purposes, which is 
something we advocate, you know—protecting IDP camps and refugee 
camps and things like that, which I think is very easy to do with private 
security.  In Darfur, you know, it would take about ten minutes if we stopped 
the killing.  There’s still the policy aspect, which still has to be sorted out, but 
that’s something that policymakers should do for private companies.   
¾ Obama has made it clear that he wants to wrap things up there and try to 
reverse the negative trend that is going on in Afghanistan.  So, we’ll see a lot 
more logistics and support there.  Security there, interestingly, is 99.7%—or 
the [inaudible] security is 99.7% Afghan, which I think is pretty interesting; 
0.2% is Americans, 0.1% third country nationals. And so it’s very different 
than Iraq where half the security was Iraqi and the other half-third country 
nationals. 
¾ I think one thing Iraq has proved beyond a shadow of a doubt about the 
industry is…I know Peter Singer and others have been claiming that once the 
shooting started the companies have disappeared.  That really hasn’t 
happened.  I mean, you know, you go to KBR and in five years there has 
been—what—three or four convoys that were halted because of risk, which is 
about the same number as the military.  The military ones had to disobey 
orders to not do their run, so the fact is the private industry has been very 
robust and ready to take risks and so on. 
¾ I have to be careful with this.  They [retired 4-stars] help.  I would say 
basically what they’ve brought is their historical relationships.  With that, that 
is truly a relationship position.  Our new CEO is 40; he’s a rocket scientist for 
real.  With that, we are becoming truly a business entity.  When I say that, we 
are creating the best of both worlds in our corporate strategy in the sense of 
being a truly lean infrastructure that functions at a profitable level because 
that actually introduces cost savings and value added to the government as 
well. Poor-run organizations always cost more. 
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¾ We’re an underlying support structure for government functions.  That’s the 
best way to put it. 
¾ When I think of a private military force, I think of the incidents in Africa and 
certain companies that are used for specific tools.  Obviously, some of the 
ones in Africa were to start a revolution, etc., or protect the government.  Yes, 
those are truly private military forces.  You know, I know that Eric Prince one 
time said he could [inaudible]. But the vision of troops…he’s not a military.  I 
would not identify us, personally, as a private military force.  I mean, that’s 
just not what we do.  We do training; we do infrastructure and design; we do 
logistics, contingency operations; but if the US government says we need 120 
guys to go to Africa and fight for us, that’s not what we do. 
¾ They’re right.  When the war started, a lot of people…well, I’ll give you an 
example.  When the war started—and I think you can find this online if you go 
to the MNFI web page, which is the Baghdad multinational forces page—at 
one time there was like 170 security companies in Iraq.  Out of that, the only 
registered companies for business that I know of…I think we’re the only one.   
Even Blackwater and Triple Canopy don’t have their licenses yet.  So, what 
I’m saying is: yes, you’re right, there were a ton of mom-and-pop, as I call it, 
organizations who tried to get into the game and then would try it sell…and 
then even Triple Canopy is for sale last I heard.  Blackwater is privately held 
by Eric Prince, so when it comes to vertical integration, the smaller 
companies have kind of gone to the [segue?].  The big ones have stayed 
status quo. 
¾ I’d say it’s the same.  I mean, obviously being big gives you the ability to 
financially support yourself.  One of the things in dealing with the US 
government is that they don’t pay on time, so there is many a time that 
companies actually float bills for the government.  Being larger obviously 
gives you a better cash-flow position or revolving line of credit, depending on 
how you’re doing it, versus a smaller company where sometimes they can’t 
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afford that.  Obviously, smaller companies sometimes have the ability to bend 
and be more flexible than a larger company, so I think it’s apples and 
oranges.  I think personally, it doesn’t have that big effect. But someone from 
a smaller company might say different. 
¾ My company, including myself, I encourage it.  I’m a firm believer in 
transparency.  I know that during my time in Iraq, I actually helped create 
some of the data that was given to the State Department on our program 
demonstrating who was performing well, who was performing poorly, the 
number of shootings, etc.  I think that’s important.  I think the reality is, I 
mean, the work is never going to go away.  It will reduce, but certain countries 
will always outsource certain parts of their work.  The whole point is…a good 
example is the new [inaudible] agreement.  Have you heard about that? 
Right?  Which is a huge issue for contractors.  That doesn’t mean we’re going 
home.  I mean our guys are trained and up to the standards that they will 
follow all of the laws as it is.  I mean, obviously, if anything happens—and I’m 
sure one will somewhere—it will be interesting to see how it plays out, but at 
the same time, we encourage guys to understand they are in a foreign 
country and to follow not only US law but the local laws.  So, I’m in full 
agreement with any rules that come out. 
¾ [We have a fellow to make part of our core competency to using his ?] as a 
partner. And he’s just dogs. He’s had lots of experience. His dogs went 
through—did a stint in Iraq, did a lot of good work there. 
R1: Okay. Wait, who was that again? 
I1: The—it’s Patriot K9. 
R1: Okay, yeah. He’s part of IPOA, too, as well, correct? 
I1: Correct. That’s actually how we met up. [inaudible] so I gave him a call. 
[inaudible]; he’s a great guy.  
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¾ I can’t tell you why we went over there to begin with. It’s probably because it 
was a good opportunity to make money, I suppose . .. We want to get back 
overseas because the margins for profit are better than they are in the States.  
¾ [A]nd I think a lot of it has to do with price. They bid it too low and they don’t 
have the money to keep the guys trained, to keep them properly equipped 
with…and looking good with uniforms, or they don’t pay the wages. And you 
get 300% turnover in a year. 
¾ It is the business model. We sell ourselves—because we don’t advertise or 
do that sort of thing—we sell ourselves on our reputation … 
¾ But we also—this will digress…this will get us off track a little bit—but when 
we have people who apply and send us resumes, if we can’t use them, what 
we do is place them with somebody else.  We forward their name along 
because these guys really want to get out there.  So, what we do is if we 
know a good reputable company, and we trust and believe in them, then we 
will forward their name on. That’s just…we pat each other’s back. 
¾ Well, from our experience—you probably saw our website—backgrounds, the 
way we approach things.  We make sure we do this in a very professional 
manner and not just…You’ve heard the cowboy mentality that goes on at 
some of these locations. We don’t do that.  So, we’re building a different 
environment.  There are stories that go on and on about—well, you know—
people get out of control.  We don’t tolerate that.  We’re building a very 
professional corporation. 
 
(On what makes for a cowboy firm) 
¾ And that comes right direct from the people who run the company and how it 
filters down.  They just kind of…some of them…like I know one corporation 
that was bought by investors 100%, and their quality of their people and their 
attitudes declined quite a bit because they were just doing it for the dime 
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instead of worrying about the product and taking care of the mission and 
going down there and making sure that everybody’s doing what they’re 
supposed to do. 
¾ No.  It’s strictly management.  The employees are going to do what 
management will let them, or kind of if they turn their back like they don’t 
care—“boys will be boys” attitude. That’s where that problem comes in. 
 
(Talking about being in a private company versus in the military) 
¾ I think it’s…it is a fairly important distinction, and that we don’t forget. I mean, 
we don’t consider ourselves government employees. And, then when I was 
on government service, I mean…I certainly…that was…Now, let me…let 
me…parenthetically, that doesn’t mean that…that I…you know…I changed a 
persona or that my ethics changed or any of those things. I mean, those kinds 
of things are…continue from one…from one profession to the other. 
¾ [F]ewer of our missions are concerned going after and actually doing the work 
for the host country. There is a period of time, obviously, when the, the 
balance between how much work the ***** personnel—person—is doing 
versus the host country person that we are working with is skewed to the side 
of the ****** subject matter expert. But, as quickly as we possible can, we shift 
that burden over towards the host country personnel so that they can learn by 
doing, where we are there just to assist them and guide them through the 
processes. We’re also involved in some cases in individual, staff, and 
organizational training. 
¾ By that I mean that there is kind of this notion that training people to fire really 
well is going to somehow potentially lead to human rights’ violations. And we 
would…we would postulate that…that it’s the exact opposite. And that is to 
say that disciplined soldiers who have confidence in their weapons are going 
to be far less likely to fire randomly than those that are unsure about their 
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weapons, have rarely fired their weapons, and are not controlled by…by their 
leadership. 
¾ As we…as we get younger people coming in who have not had military 
background that are doing different things, as we bring in police—they have a 
different culture—we bring in State Department personnel—they have a 
different culture. And I think one of the things that we do as a private 
organization that we bring to the table is the inner-agency coordination  
possibilities—capabilities. And, by that I mean that, as you know, we as a 
nation are still struggling with the ability for different agencies to work 
together. 
¾ One of the things that we…that we bring in a…when we go into a theater—
and I think this is across the board among companies, but I’d like to think that 
we do it well at *****—is that we can give you one-stop shopping to provide 
the…the relationships between the different cultures, be they state, military, 
USAID [?], law enforcement,…and that, whereas, even within a sub-staff—
say, the staff that you’d have in X country on the US side that is to provide 
support for that host country, and is also somewhat stove-piped within 
operations, intelligence, logistics, personnel, and so on.We…we…we tend to 
have a different philosophy for security, and thus far its worked out for us. 
There is…there’s obviously a risk involved and that is that we…we don’t tend 
to drive around in convoys with lots of guns.  Some might say we don’t have 
any high-value targets, and we try…we try to keep it that way—not to be so 
valuable that somebody’s going to want to attack our two vehicles going down 
the road in Afghanistan or Iraq. In…in cases where we do need that kind 
of…that kind of support, we rely on the US military in order to provide that 
kind of…that kind of support. Our buildings where we live and so on like that 
are…are protected by companies that are contracted for by the…by the US 
government. And, so there’s that…there’s…and we…we are really a training 
and education company that goes all the way from the very strategic level, all 
the way down to training soldiers how to fire their weapons properly. There 
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aren’t too many companies out there, although the number is probably 
growing, that really have that kind of capability. 
¾ They’ll be able to go in to a ministry and operate with the minister and some 
of his senior subordinates. 
¾ There are…there are companies that are…and ethics is always a very 
difficult…difficult value to apply, but there are some companies out there that 
are probably—in terms of their ethical standards—are maybe not…we…we 
would like to think that we have very high ethical standards that separate us 
from some other companies. I’m certainly not going to name any companies 
or anything like that, but…but…that…that…that…in this field…in these…the 
work that is being done here… There are companies that operate, frankly, 
more ethically than others. 
¾ I understand what you’re saying, and, I mean, one of the things we’re 
somewhat fortunate in—that we don’t get involved with—with armed security. 
And so that is probably the ultimate area where…where behavior—and I 
won’t even call it unethical—but, behavior will be…will be scrutinized to see 
whether it was ethical or not…is that area. And, so from that standpoint I…I’ll 
be…I will admit that that [?] cutting edge it’s a…you have a potential to get 
yourself in those kinds of situations where somebody’s going to question your 
ethics—whether or not it’s justified or not.  But, I mean, that—shouldn’t have 
fired/should have fired—you know, Indus—you know, etc.—all the things that 
we know about from a couple…some of the companies that have been…been 
involved with that. 
(On how the company deals with bad behavior) 
¾ That it…when something does occur, and the rare exception concerning 
people we have, for example, in Afghanistan, the person will be on the next 
plane out of there. I mean, there is no tolerance for…for bad behavior, 
basically. […] [Explanation of why there is a zero tolerance policy] And, you 
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know, if there are violations, we have…whereas a military personnel might be 
punished there on the spot and have…you know…in our case, what 
we…what our core punishment…our ability really is to say “okay, violation of 
ruling, you’re…you know…you’re out of there.” So…[inaudible]. 
 (When asked if oversight procedures have changed given recent 
attention to contractors: ) 
¾ No, really it hasn’t.  We haven’t changed one iota.  Again, I think this goes 
back to the type of folks we have.  They’re taught ethical behavior in the 
military, and we don’t have all Air Force people, but obviously the bulk of 
them are prior Air Force individuals.  They’re taught that in the military.  
They’re taught the management skills and, I guess what you might say, 
dependability.  You have a person that needs to work a little extra time to get 
the job done, they’re going to do that.  Those are the skills they brought with 
them, and we’ve maintained that.  That’s why we’ve been on this contract for 
21 years now.   
¾ Well, no, I think there are differences between companies and the main 
difference…well, there’s a lot of differences, but the biggest one—we just 
went back there. Going back to one of our previous questions is your 
repetition—or reputation. I’ll get it right here in a minute. And, you know, what 
you bring to the table as to what your expertise is because some companies 
are very strong in security.  I’m sure, there are other companies that are very 
strong in civil engineering area, and I’d use KBR as an example of that with 
all their doing over in the Afghanistan and Iraq areas.  And there are some 
companies, like ourselves, who are very strong in, as I see it, doing a variety 
of functions supporting an entire base complex.   
¾ It really boils down to most of the cost in this business is labor, so the real 
challenge is to be able to attract good talent that can manage and do the work 
you want them to do, but yet at a fairly low price.  In other words, keep the 
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labor costs down.  What makes that a challenge particularly for us is outside 
the areas where you would receive the hostile fire pay or the hazardous pay 
is the fact that those places where they get that sort of differential—get those 
big bucks—draw a lot of the top talent.   
¾ Yeah, I would say basically it is like this: ***** doesn’t own property, so all of 
this property belongs to the Government and once the contract ends, we will 
give it all back to them. What ***** brings here is a lot of really skilled people 
who are really skilled in the particular job that they do. 
¾ Well, they’re all the same in [that] they’re getting money, but aside from that, 
there are all sorts of various models, especially among those companies and 
what they personally can do and think they’re about, and their ethos.  
Between a DynCorp and ArmorCorp, an Aegis or a Blackwater—under an 
assumed name these days—or Triple Canopy, they all have a slightly 
different take and ethos.  ******, itself, too—which kind of colors its approach 
to the various topics.  You know, the Blackwater approach being a more 
tactical approach to it.  The **** being a little bit more operational in their 
approach to it.  So, even the level of entry into these various things differs 
among the various companies playing to their strengths.  I found out in the 
companies of those that in the hiring line hired folks at the company grade or 
lower primarily as their employees, and that’s how they kind of thought.  If 
they hired at the general officer and colonel, low and behold, that’s kind of 
how they thought.  So the character and flavor of their employee base pretty 
much affected how they would approach the various problems.    
¾ And also, the founders and the founders’ philosophy too helps in shaping that, 
especially if it’s more of a company that’s more focused on a founder who is 
still around as opposed to a company that’s been around forever like Pacific 
Architects and Engineers (PA&E) who’s been around well beyond before the 
Vietnam War.  So there’s no personal founder left anymore and its moved on 
to a more corporate philosophy. 
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¾ I mean, there’s a grouping of firms.  The top one being Blackwater, mainly 
because they’ve invested in their own training facilities and invested time and 
effort and money in producing a tactical product.   
¾ There is differentiation between [Intelligence contractors] too as to what they 
can handle and what they can’t handle and what their niche is.  I’m not sure 
which niches are the niches there, because they don’t talk that loudly about 
their niches.  And also to what extent they actually go in and do collecting is 
another issue that I’m not clear on. But as far as the processing analysis 
presentations and number crunching and things like that, they do quite a bit.  
And, of course, some of them become extensions of combat and command 
as well where they’ve provided secure facilities and other things to assist 
combat and command in various areas and places. 
¾ That’s an interesting conundrum that’s come up.  As the military puts more of 
its brainpower into contracting and contractors and have contractors begin to 
do studies and stuff that military staff used to do, one wonders whether the 
contractors are going to develop their own training programs because right 
now they’ve been able to depend upon fully trained military folks retiring and 
walking right into their world with enough expertise to carry the day.  As the 
military gets a little smaller and as this crowd of folks reaches their ultimate 
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